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Runway incursions, events in which an aircraft, vehicle, or person is located on a runway surface without authorization, continue to
be a constant threat to aviation safety. Previously identified on the ‘‘Most Wanted’’ list of aviation safety issues by the National
Transportation Safety Board, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has spent significant amounts of money and effort to address
runway incursions. Little empirical evidence has been collected on the effectiveness of such efforts. Moreover, the data that are available
provide a confusing landscape of contradicting findings. Some FAA publications claim that runway incursions are decreasing while the
evidence provided in such documents support the contrary. News headlines tout decreases in runway incursions while briefly stating that
they are increasing in recent years. The purpose of this quantitative causal-comparative and correlational study was to provide an
improved understanding of trends in runway incursions based on statistical analysis rather than on generalizations. The findings of this
study indicated that from 2001 to 2017 runway incursions appear to have a strong, positive correlation with ascending years, i.e., are
increasing over time (r 5 0.995, p, 0.001). Each type of incursion severity category (A, B, C, and D) is further analyzed. Also, analysis
for the last five and ten years was conducted to focus on more recent trends. Suggestions for future research are also provided.
Keywords: aviation, safety, airports, runway incursion, quantitative
Introduction
Runway incursions, events in which something (e.g., an aircraft, vehicle, or pedestrian) erroneously occupies a runway,
are considered an extremely serious hazard to aviation. One of the worst aviation accidents was a result of a runway
incursion. Because of an aircraft operating on the runway in Tenerife, Canary Islands, contrary to air traffic control
expectations, two Boeing 747s collided, claiming 583 lives (National Transportation Safety Board [NTSB], 2007).
The potential for fatalities among runway incursions cannot be underestimated, especially considering increasing global
air traffic as well as the utilization of supersized aircraft such as the Airbus A-380 with a seating capacity of over
600 passengers (Federal Aviation Administration [FAA], 2017a; Mutzabaugh, 2015). For several years, the NTSB has
placed runway safety improvements on its list of ‘‘Most Wanted Transportation Safety Improvements’’ calling for the FAA
to take significant measures to decrease rates of incursions (NTSB, n.d.). Clearly, the tracking of runway incursion
incidence is paramount for scrutinizing system safety and identifying problematic trends. Accordingly, the FAA has
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implemented mandatory reporting of runway incursion
events and stores the resultant data within its Runway
Incursion Database (RWS) (FAA, 2017b).
To address multi-agency concerns over runway incursions,
the FAA has invested in a variety of safety enhancements,
including Airport Surface Detection Equipment-Model X
(ASDE-X) and Runway Status Lights (RWSL). The
former is a system that improves air traffic control over-
sight and monitoring of aircraft and vehicle movements
on the ground while the latter provides visual indications
to pilots and drivers about the occupancy status of
runways and clearance to enter such areas (FAA, 2007;
Office of the Inspector General—Department of Trans-
portation [OIG], 2018).
Of course, if these investments yield significant impro-
vements in safety, it can be said that the benefits out-
weighed the costs. When dealing with saving lives, even a
slight improvement in safety can be considered a success.
However, the reality is that the success of runway safety
improvements, specifically that of RWSL, has not been
empirically analyzed. The FAA repeatedly reports ‘‘suc-
cess’’ in its runway incursion rates displayed in annual
performance and accountability reports, yet the treatment of
the data is limited to displaying graphs, which include
misleading visual indicators marking trends in the data
(FAA, 2014, 2015a, 2016, 2017a). News articles provide
more confusion by reporting that while runway incursions
in the USA have declined since the 1990s, incursions are
actually on the rise since 2013 (Flight Safety Foundation
[FSF], 2017). Unfortunately, no statistical analysis of runway
incursion rates has been conducted to identify what trends in
rates exist and if differences beyond ‘‘eyeballing’’ of data
are significant (Morrison & Winston, 2008; Scho¨nefeld &
Mo¨ller, 2012).
Considering these issues, it appears necessary to evaluate
the efficacy of FAA investments in runway incursion
prevention. The question that remains is: what is the actual
trend in runway incursions in the USA? Currently, the
problem is that there have been mixed messages about
runway incursion rate changes. Moreover, there has been
no statistical analysis of the available data. Evaluations of
incursion trends can provide insight into the effectiveness
of programs such as ASDE-X and RWSL. They can also
help evaluate the return on investment of over $1 billion
of tax-payer dollars and appraise the allocation of safety
improvement funds to the best possible technologies, pro-
cedures, and education strategies (Scho¨nefeld & Mo¨ller,
2012; Van Eekeren, Wright, & Cˇokorilo, 2018).
Literature Review
Defining runway incursions
A runway incursion is currently defined by the FAA, as
adopted from the International Civil Aviation Organization
(ICAO), as ‘‘any occurrence at an aerodrome involving
the incorrect presence of an aircraft, vehicle or person on
the protected area of a surface designated for the landing
and takeoff of aircraft’’ (FAA, 2008, p. 37). Incursions are
categorized by severity to reflect the level of danger to
airport operations. Category A and B events are highlighted
as ‘‘serious incursions’’ by the FAA (2017a, p. 43) and
involve the highest risk for accident occurrence. The formal
definitions for each category are:
N Category A: a serious incident in which a collision
was narrowly avoided.
N Category B: an incident in which separation decreases
and there is a significant potential for collision, which
may result in a time-critical corrective/evasive response
to avoid a collision.
N Category C: an incident characterized by ample time
and/or distance to avoid a collision.
N Category D: incident that meets the definition of
runway incursion such as the incorrect presence of a
single vehicle/person/aircraft on the protected area of
a surface designated for the landing and takeoff of
aircraft but with no immediate safety consequences
(FAA, 2017a).
It is important to note that the FAA changed its defi-
nition of runway incursions, adopting the ICAO standards
outlined above, effective 2008. What the FAA previously
classified as category C and D incidents now fall within
category C. The current category D did not technically exist
in the FAA nomenclature before 2008. See Figure 1 for a
comparison of pre-2008 and current definitions.
Because of the definition changes, there was a spike in
category C and D events in 2008. While these changes in
classifications made analyzing data before and after the
revision more complicated, the severity categories (A and
B) remained analogous. Figure 2 shows the impact of the
adoption of the ICAO definition for incursions had on total
numbers of reported events. Of course, this caused total
runway incursion numbers and associated graphics to indi-
cate a dramatic rise in incursions. Thus, caution in making
comparisons across all categories, especially category D,
before and after the definition change is necessary (FAA,
2008, 2009, 2010; United States Government Accoun-
tability Office, 2008).
Previous research on runway incursions
Research on runway incursions has taken a variety of
forms but generally tends to concentrate on the seriousness
of the threat they present to aviation as well as mitiga-
tion strategies. Mrazova (2014) highlighted the significant
progress that has been made worldwide to combat incur-
sions but cautioned that stakeholders must ‘‘be careful and
concentrate…on the effort to keep as low as possible the
numbers of incidents’’ (p. 71). The author described the
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different parties that were found to be at fault in incursion
events, namely air traffic control, flight-crew/pilots, and
drivers (i.e., vehicle). Pilot deviations have historically
been the largest source of incursions. In particular, general
aviation pilots were the overwhelming cause of most incur-
sions. Additional threats to runway safety that were descri-
bed included pedestrians and wildlife.
Scho¨nefeld and Mo¨ller (2012) reviewed runway incur-
sion avoidance and alerting systems in detail. The authors
noted incursion trends at the time of publication and
forecasted traffic growth incursions were likely to increase.
The study indicated that runway incursions are not a
problem localized to the USA, as European airports such
as Zurich and London Heathrow report a large number of
events annually. As incursions are due primarily to human
error, mitigation is best approached by data fusion of
sensors, maps, tracks, and movement models at individual
airports to help operations stakeholders to avoid mistakes.
Based on simulation, the study highlighted that there is the
potential of up to an 80% reduction in runway incursions
Figure 1. Comparison of pre-2008 and current FAA definitions of runway incursions. From FAA (2008).
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when mitigation technologies are correctly installed and
used. It was noted that the introduction of Final Approach
Runway Occupancy Signal (FAROS) and RWSL reduced
incursions at Dallas-Ft. Worth International Airport by as
much as 70% (Scho¨nefeld & Mo¨ller, 2012).
According to Scho¨nefeld and Mo¨ller (2012), runway
incursion avoidance relies on four essential elements. The
pilot-centric ‘‘own ship position awareness’’ and ‘‘route
awareness’’ (Scho¨nefeld & Mo¨ller, 2012, p. 35) are critical,
as pilots must maintain situational awareness of where they
are and where they are traveling on the airport surface.
Also, ‘‘route deviation detection’’ (Scho¨nefeld & Mo¨ller,
2012, p. 35) is needed to determine when pilots deviate
from the expected surface route. Lastly, ‘‘runway activity
status’’ (Scho¨nefeld & Mo¨ller, 2012, p. 35) is necessary to
detect runway occupancy or impending occupancy for both
pilots and controllers. Proper incursion prevention system
functioning is reliant on a variety of technologies and
programming algorithms, all of which are potentially very
expensive and complex (Scho¨nefeld & Mo¨ller, 2012).
Scho¨nefeld and Mo¨ller (2012) detailed the theoretical
potential for increased safety through prevention systems.
However, there was no statistical analysis of existing data.
Moreover, ‘‘the installation of signals is a costly process’’
requiring the installation of ‘‘kilometers of cables’’
(Scho¨nefeld & Mo¨ller, 2012, p. 37) in addition to compo-
nent costs. The maintenance costs of such systems are also
high because they must be kept in perfect working in order
to be effective.
In one of the only studies available in current literature
utilizing an empirical analysis of runway incursion data,
Green (2013) examined characteristics of and rates of
incursions. It was determined that from 2001 to 2012, only
category C and D incursions increased by a statistically
significant amount (p # 0.10), while there was no such
significance in changes in category A and B events. The
author was not aware of or did not disclose the possible
limitation of the change in the definition of runway
incursions that became effective in 2008 as a potential
influence on the outcomes of this analysis. Using a coding
schema for category A (with a collision) incursions (coded
‘‘5’’) through category D events (coded ‘‘1’’), a linear
robust structure model was developed. The projected slope
for category D was positive and steep, indicating an increase
in such events. The same was noted for category C, although
with a positive slope that was less severe. The slopes for
categories A with a collision, A, and B all had slight negative
slopes.
Confusing data on runway incursion trends
A common trait within the available literature is that
there is no consensus on trends in runway incursions and
the actual impact that runway incursion mitigation impro-
vements have had on system safety. In August 2017,
the FSF published an article titled ‘‘Serious Runway
Incursions Down at U.S. Airports.’’ The document high-
lighted that ‘‘the number of serious runway incursions at
Figure 2. Incursions, by quarter, during fiscal year 2007 and fiscal year 2008. From United States Government Accountability Office (2008).
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U.S. airports has declined dramatically over the past nearly
20 years’’ (FSF, 2017, para. 1). Nevertheless, in reference
to serious runway incursions, the sentence finishes ‘‘but has
been trending higher since 2013, according to the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA) statistics’’ (FSF, 2017,
para. 1). The article highlighted the fact that RWSL has
been installed at eleven large U.S. airports and installations
at nine more are in progress, including New York JFK
International and Chicago O’Hare airports, implying that
these systems have been successful in reducing incursions
(FSF, 2017).
Existing research on runway incursions provides a mixed
message about the assumption that runway incursions have
decreased. Models calculated by Green (2013) indicated
a positive slope (increase) in runway incursions from 2001
to 2012. Mrazova (2014) stated that there was a 21%
reduction in incursions between 2011 and 2012. Yet the
author stated, based upon increasing traffic levels, it could
be expected that this trend would reverse.
Data from the FAA further add to the confusion about
actual trends in runway incursions. In both the 2015 and
2016 Performance and Accountability Reports, the FAA
(2016) provided diagrams of runway incursion rates which
are perplexing (see Figures 3 and 4). As can be seen in the
graphical depictions from the report, there is a large down
arrow indicating a decrease in the rate of serious runway
incursions. However, the trend for actual incursions is not
in agreement with the claim of reduced incidence.
Contrarily, the difference between actual rates from 2010
(0.117 per million operations [PMO]) to 2015 (0.302 PMO)
shows a 158% increase in the rate. There was a 160%
increase in the rate when comparing 2011 (0.138 PMO)
versus 2016 (0.360 PMO). In the 2016 report, the FAA
claimed that it had ‘‘made significant progress in improving
Figure 3. Serious runway incursion rate graphic published in 2015. From FAA (2015a).
Figure 4. Serious runway incursion rate graphic published in 2016. From FAA (2016).
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runway safety at U.S. airports over the past
15 years’’ and that the FAA had been successful because
the actual rate was below its ‘‘target’’ measure (FAA,
2015a, 2016).
In the 2017 FAA Performance and Accountability
Report, it was indicated that runway incursion rates decrea-
sed by 65% from 2016 (see Figure 5) (FAA, 2017a). When
comparing 2011 to 2017, there was a 5.8% reduction in
incursion rates. In contrast, when comparing 2010 to 2017,
incursions had increased by 11%. Further, the data in the
report were preliminary for 2017. From more current data,
the actual incursion rate for 2017 was 0.160 PMO, indi-
cating a 16% increase from 2011 and up 36% from 2010.
When comparing 2016 and 2017 data, there was a 55%
reduction (FAA, 2016, 2017a, 2017b, n.d.).
In a separate document, the FAA stated that it had
completed its goal of a 25% reduction in the number of
serious runway incursions as the actual reduction in incur-
sion numbers was 44%. The published graphic can be seen
in Figure 6. While there is no doubt that, based on the
provided data, the numbers of dangerous occurrences are
trending downwards, though caution is necessary when
looking at counts as they do not reflect potential influences
that fluctuations in traffic and other potential confounding
variables may have on these data. Figure 7 shows the
airport operations volume, which was down 13% from
2008 to 2014 which likely had an impact on counts of
incursions.
Complicating the claim of runway incursion reduction is
that while serious incursions were down for 2017, the total
number of incursions continues to rise since the incursion
definition change in 2008, as can be seen in Figure 8.
Additional figures provided by the FAA indicated that there
is a trend of increasing numbers of runway incursions (see
Figure 9). The ‘‘achievement’’ of annual FAA targets is
also misleading as, if examined at the monthly levels in
data from 2014, there are several instances that indicate
an exceedance of performance limits for incursion rates
Figure 5. Serious runway incursion rate graphic published in 2017. From FAA (2017a).
Figure 6. Serious runway incursion rate graphic published in 2017. From FAA (2017a).
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Figure 7. Excel graph of airport operations volumes 2008–2014. From FAA (n.d.).
Figure 8. Counts of incursions by severity classification 2000–2014. From FAA (2015b).
Figure 9. Total monthly and cumulative runway incursions for 2013 and 2014. From FAA (2015c).
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(as noted by the line demarcated by triangles) (see Figure 10)
(FAA, 2015b, 2015c).
As can be seen from the available data and research,
there is inconsistency among sources about the actual
trends in runway incursions. Table 1 summarizes these
contradictions. It is essential to consider the context of
each data point and graphical display. The FAA presents
a moving snapshot of six years in its performance and
accountability reports. These irregularities prevent readers
from seeing longer-range trends in the data. The use of
graphics with conflicting messages (e.g., a sizeable down
arrow with data-point lines showing the opposite trend) and
the intermixing of incursion rates with counts can be
misunderstood by readers. Unfortunately, the FAA does
not make the process of calculating its targets known in its
publications. One would assume that this is derived from
the modeling incursion rates and counts, but it is unclear
how the target is derived and why or when it should be
adjusted. The mixed messages in FAA documents, media,
and within existing research create the potential for
confusion in attempts to identify the actual state of runway
safety in the USA (FAA 2015b, 2015c, 2017a, 2017b, n.d.;
FSF, 2017).
Method
The purpose of this quantitative, causal-comparative, and
correlational study was to analyze empirical data on run-
way incursions to determine actual differences and trends
over time. The goal of the study was to provide insight into
whether runway incursions have been decreasing and the
potential impacts of FAA safety improvement investments
on runway incursions.
Sampling procedures
All data were garnered from the Operations Network
(OPSNET) and Runway Incursions (RWS) FAA databases
(FAA, 2017b, n.d.). System-wide airport tower operations
volume data were harvested from OPSNET. Overflight
traffic was omitted to mimic the method that the FAA uses
to calculate rates of incursions. From the RWS database,
counts of runway incursions were collected by severity type
(i.e., A, B, C, and D). Rates of incursion occurrence were
calculated for each year by dividing the total number of
incursions for each severity type, by the applicable total
airport tower volume for the year. Data were selected from
2001 through 2017 as RWS only provides data back to
2001 and, at the time of the study, 2018 data were
incomplete.
Sample size, power, and precision
Sample sizes were limited by the eighteen years of data
that were available. A priori power calculations were
conducted for the statistical analyses. It should be noted
that more data than were available would be necessary to
ensure 0.80 power. Post hoc power analysis is discussed in
the results.
Measures
Count data from OPSNET were collected and reflect the
total number of non-overflight towered airport operations.
Count data from RWS were collected and reflect the
number of runway incursions by type of severity. Data
from both sources were downloaded in comma-separated
values (CSV) file format for use with statistical software.
Generally, government data are considered to be of high
validity and reliability due to mandatory reporting and
administrative oversight. Annual rates of incursions were
calculated using Microsoft Excel to divide the number of
incursions by the total tower airport operations for each
Figure 10. Counts and rates of incursions by month for 2014. From FAA (2015c).
Table 1




Mrazova (2014) Decrease (but likely to increase)
FAA (2015a, b) Decrease (some data indicated increase)
FAA (2016) Decrease (some data indicated increase)
FAA (2017a) Decrease (some data indicated increase)
FSF (2017) Both decrease and increase
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year. All rates were calculated on a PMO basis, which is
the typical value used by the FAA. Because of the nature
of counts and the distributions of the data, non-parametric
tests were utilized for analysis of these types of data (Field,
2013). SPSS statistical software was utilized to conduct
correlations. SPSS was also utilized to conduct Mann–
Whitney U comparisons of 2001–2007 versus 2008–2017
(last ten years of data) and 2001–2012 versus 2013–2017
(last five years of data). Microsoft Excel and SPSS were
used to produce a graphical output of appropriate data.
Research design
The designs used in this study were causal-comparative
and correlational. Mann–Whitney U tests were utilized to
determine differences in rates due to the non-parametric
nature of the data. Spearman correlations were conducted to
evaluate the relationship between incursion rates over time.
Spearman correlation was selected due to the discrete
nature of years and operations (Field, 2013; Salkind, 2010;
University of Minnesota Library, 2018). The decision to
use this type of analysis as well as its applicability for
assessing trends over time were adapted from Ogihara et al.
(2015). Because both comparison and relationships within
the data were being evaluated, these two designs were
found to be appropriate to guide this study (Creswell &
Creswell, 2017).
Results
Statistical and data analysis
Incursions: General trends and differences
SPSS was utilized to produce descriptive statistics on the
data. A summary of the descriptive values can be found in
Table 2. Incursions were grouped by severity as A and B as
well as C and D, to ensure appreciable scales. Spearman
correlations were calculated in SPSS to assess the relation-
ship of the year with rates of runway incursions by type of
severity. The output of this calculation can be found in
Table 3. For this study, correlation coefficient values are
considered to be weak when less than 0.30, moderate when
0.30–0.699, and strong when greater than 0.70 (Field,
2013). According to several statistical theorists, Bonferroni
corrections in correlation analysis are considered unneces-
sary, and therefore they were not applied (Field, 2013;
Perneger, 1998). Correlation was used in lieu of regression
because of the inapplicability of parametric analysis. To
further guard against issues of distributions of the data,
correlation calculations included bootstrapping 95% con-
fidence intervals utilizing bias-corrected accelerated (BCa)
methods (Field, 2013).
Spearman’s r correlations with ascending years from
2001 to 2017 indicated that a weak negative relationship
existed with the rate of A severity events while a moderate
negative relationship existed with rates of B severity
incursions (p . 0.05). Strong, positive correlations were
noted with C and D severity rates of incursions (p , 0.001).
The relationship between ascending year and total incursion
rates (including all severity types) was significant (r5 0.995,
p , 0.001). Bootstrapped BCa confidence intervals for each
rate are provided in Table 4.
Evaluating correlations of counts utilizing Spearman’s r,
there was a significant, strong negative association between
total tower airport operations and ascending years (see
Table 5). There was a moderate negative correlation
between ascending years and counts of A and B severity
incursions. Contrarily, C and D counts were strongly,
Table 2
Descriptive statistics: operations, A, A rate, B, B rate, C, C rate, D, and D
rate.
Variable Mean StDev Variance Median
Ops 56,040,790 6,320,606 3.99501 6 1013 52,239,072
A 9.29 5.70 32.47 8.00
A_Rate 0.01626 0.00898 0.00008 0.01581
B 9.53 5.84 34.14 9.00
B_Rate 0.01649 0.00893 0.00008 0.01528
C 352.8 246.7 60865.8 365.0
C_Rate 0.678 0.509 0.259 0.667
D 1234 628 393,840 1197
D_Rate 2.323 1.325 1.755 2.091
Note. A, B, C, and D are counts. Incursion rates are noted as ‘‘rate.’’
Table 3
Spearman correlations: year, A rate, B rate, C rate, and D rate.
Year A rate B rate C rate
A rate 20.206
0.428
B rate 20.461 0.123
0.063 0.639
C rate 0.931 20.365 20.331
0.000** 0.149 0.195
D rate 0.995 20.216 20.434 0.936
0.000** 0.406 0.082 0.000**
Note. Incursion rates are noted as ‘‘rate.’’ Top number in each cell is
Spearman r, below is p-value.
**p , 0.01.
Table 4
Bootstrapping BCa confidence intervals (CI): year, A rate, B rate, C rate,
D rate, and total rate.
Rate type Year
Lower CI Upper CI
A ratea 20.676 +0.360
B ratea 20.860 +0.126
C rate +0.800 +0.978
D rate +0.962 +1.00
Total rate +0.013 +0.0963
aCI crosses zero.
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positively correlated to years. A and B counts were weakly
and negatively correlated with C and D counts. Thankfully,
C and D events are negatively correlated with A and B
events, so the rise of the former will not, in theory,
necessarily eventually result in increases of the latter.
Assessing C and D counts showed a strong, positive
association between specific groups of these events. There
did not appear to be an association between total tower
airport operations and total incursion counts (r 5 20.086,
p 5 0.743).
In order to further gauge the directionality of data,
trendlines were added to visualizations of incursion counts
and rates using the linear trendline function of Excel (see
Figures 11–14). R2 values calculated by the Excel trendline
function are included for rates. Rates for the last five and
Table 5
Spearman correlations: year, operations, A, B, C, and D.





B 20.617 0.522 0.308
0.008* 0.032* 0.229
C 0.926 20.860 20.447 20.487
0.000** 0.000** 0.072 0.047*
D 0.990 20.922 20.313 20.581 0.929
0.000** 0.000** 0.222 0.015* 0.000**
Note. A, B, C, and D are counts. Top number in each cell is Spearman’s r,
below is p-value.
*p , 0.05; **p , 0.01.
Figure 11. A and B severity counts of incursions 2001–2017 with linear trendlines.
Figure 12. C and D severity counts of incursions 2001–2017 with linear trendlines.
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ten years were compared to periods previous there of
(2001–2012 vs. 2013–2017 and 2001–2007 vs. 2008–
2017, respectively) using Mann–Whitney U tests. The
results are displayed in Table 6. Linear trendlines were
added to visualizations of incursion counts and rates using
the trendline function of Excel for further clarity of actual
data trends (see Figures 11–14) (FAA, 2016, 2017a).
Incursions: Post hoc power analysis
Post hoc power analysis was conducted on insignifi-
cant correlations and Mann–Whitney U tests, which were
found not to meet the desired threshold of 1 2 b 5 0.80.
Unfortunately, due to the type of data being analyzed,
it was not possible to increase sample sizes. These
issues are discussed in the limitations section of the
discussion.
Discussion
For simplicity purposes, the discussion of findings will
follow the order of tables and other outlined statistical
results then move on to figures.
Figure 13. A and B severity rates of incursions 2001–2017 with linear trendlines. (R2 A rate 5 0.0481; B rate 5 0.2598.)
Figure 14. C and D severity rates of incursions 2001–2017 with linear trendlines. (R2 C rate 5 0.9118; B rate 5 0.9502.)
Table 6
Mann–Whitney U tests for A, B, C, and D rates.
Years A rate U, r, and p-value B rate U, r, and p-value C rate U, r, and p-value D rate U, r, and p-value
2001–2007 vs. 2008–2017 16.0, 0.449, 0.064 15.0, 0.473, 0.051 0, 0.828, 0.001* 0, 0.828, 0.001*
2001–2012 vs. 2013–2017 24.0, 0.153, 0.527 25.0, 0.128, 0.598 0, 0.766, 0.002* 0, 0.766, 0.002*
Note. Parameter r is effect size.
*Significance with Bonferroni correction.
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Results in tables and non-graphical format
Regarding the trend in runway incursions over the long
term, i.e., from 2001 through 2017, there was a significant
and strong, positive correlation between incursion rates and
ascending years. In short, incursion rates, as a whole, have
increased over time. Dissecting each severity category in
Table 3, it is evident that category C and D incursion rates
have been increasing over time and are the primary reason
why the overall rate has also been increasing. Rates for
category A and B incursions do appear to decrease over
time, though weakly for A events and moderately for B
events. Regardless of these findings, neither correlations for
A nor B were significant, although this can arguably be
irrelevant due to the nature of correlation as an effect size
and differing opinions among statisticians on the impor-
tance of significance in correlational analysis. More evi-
dence, however, on the lack of change in A and B incursion
rates can be garnered from the bootstrapped BCa con-
fidence intervals (Table 4), which, for these two types of
severity, included zero.
When examining counts of incursion relationship with
the passage of years, categories A and B were negatively
correlated, while C and D were positively correlated, as to
be expected based on rate data. Correlation results indicate
that A events were weakly associated with ascending years
while B events were moderately so. C and D counts, just as
was the case with rates, were strongly associated (see Table 5).
The relationships between incursion counts and the number
of operations show results contrary to assumptions found in
the literature. As seen in Table 5 data, there was a significant,
strong negative correlation between operations over time,
thus indicating overall decreased operational volumes from
2001 to 2017. The relationships between incursion category
and traffic volume do not seem to entirely agree with
assumptions within the literature that incursion incidence
is tied to operational measurements. Categories A and B
were moderately positively correlated (r 5 0.321 and r 5
0.522, respectively) with this decrease in traffic, yet for
C and D, there was a more logical strong, negative corre-
lation (r 5 20.860 and r 5 20.922, respectively).
Mann–Whitney U test results comparing rates for specific
data ranges and each severity category of incursion are
displayed in Table 6. When comparing 2001–2007 rates to
the most recent ten years of data (2008–2017), there were no
significant differences for category A and B events while
there were significant differences between C and D results.
The same pattern was true for the comparison of 2001–2012
with the most recent five years of rate data (2013–2017).
Results displayed in figures
Long-term (2001–2017) graphics of A and B severity
counts and rates across the USA show a rather erratic
pattern of occurrences (Figure 11). For categories C and D
(Figure 12), the trend is more intuitive. Due to the
distribution characteristics of rates (i.e., fitting the con-
straint of normality), R2 values were included from the
underlying regression calculation provided by the graphical
options of Microsoft Excel (Figures 13 and 14). Not
surprisingly, R2 for A incursion rates indicated a large
amount of variance (R2 5 0.0481) from the trendline, and
the trendline for B incursion rates also indicated a poor fit
(R2 5 0.2598) albeit better than that for category A. For
rates of C and D, R2 showed close fits with the trendlines
(C R2 5 0.9118; D R2 5 0.9502).
These findings shed light on the confusing nature of
how the FAA often reports its data. Depending upon the
timeframe selected, the argument about whether incursion
counts are changing could be answered differently.
Moreover, if one is examining trends utilizing a regression
line, the answer may be different from examining 2001
counts with those in 2017. As FAA reports often only
provide snapshots of data from the most recent five years,
actual differences and trends over longer-term periods may
be overlooked. Interestingly, if using the philosophy found in
several reports presented by the FAA—directly connecting a
line between the counts or rates from the beginning of a
reporting period to the end—the following conclusions could
be presented: from 2001 to 2017, both rates and counts
of category A, C, and D incursions have increased while
category B was the only group to decrease. Also, if incursions
were decreasing, it would be assumed that a reduction in
target rates would be applicable, such as when the FAA
adjusted its target from 0.450 PMO to 0.395 PMO in 2012.
The target has been kept at 0.395 PMO through 2017.
Limitations
The study does have some limitations that must be
identified. One limitation is that the FAA changed the
definition of runway incursions during data reporting
periods. Also, it is not readily apparent if or how reporting
measures changed during the periods studied in existing
research and within the current study. Another limitation of
this study is related to the power of certain aspects of the
statistical analysis. Non-significant findings in tests with
small samples cannot assuredly denote the lack of a
difference or effect. Thus, it cannot be said with certainty
that insignificant findings in this study were the result of
the lack of an actual effect or the inability of the test to
detect such an effect. The only means of increasing power
would have been to increase sample sizes, which was
impossible considering the nature of the data and the
limited availability of data from the periods analyzed.
Delimitations
This study was delimited to include only runway
incursions in the USA due to the accessibility of the data.
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Only data from FAA sources were utilized as they were
assumed to provide the most accurate and comprehensive
incursion occurrence information. Spearman correlations of
counts and rates with the passage of time (ascending years)
were selected as a means of assessing changes over time,
as exemplified within the literature. Confirmatory analysis
of identified trends was attempted through other analyses,
i.e., Mann–Whitney U tests.
Conclusion
In summary, the numbers and rates of runway incursions
have been increasing since 2001. Some of this can be
attributed to the change in the definition of incursions,
though in particular C and D severity incursions have
steadily increased even after this event. The steady increase
in these categories has been attributed, in part, to increased
reporting. However, one would assume a drastic increase in
the years immediately following inclinations for increased
reporting followed by trends that would follow traffic
volumes, at least to some extent. This is not the case, as
evident from the data. The number of A and B incursions
have had a downward trend since 2001. Graphical data also
concur with these findings. For category B incursions, only
2016–2017 saw significant differences from expected. Year
over year increases in category C and D events were evi-
dent in the analyses and graphical data. Further assessment
of variations or lack thereof was confirmed through the
Mann–Whitney U tests utilized to compare periods (2001–
2007 vs. 2008–2017 and 2001–2012 vs. 2013–2017)
showing that there were no significant differences for
category A and B while there were significant differences
indicated for categories C and D.
It is hoped that the findings of this study will provide
aviation stakeholders with more detailed data, analysis, and
interpretation of runway incursion incidence. Expectantly,
the FAA should make a more concerted effort to precisely
and analytically report incursion data made to the public.
It is reasonable to expect that the FAA display longer-range
data trends and to include standard measures of trend in
graphical depictions. For example, regression trendlines or
simple moving averages are a more reasonable means of
displaying change. In particular, moving averages are
intuitive and more responsive to annual changes in the data.
Congressional oversight of investments requested by the
FAA should include an examination of available data
which should be confirmed with sources of such data.
Suggestions for Future Research
Through the conduct of this study, needs for further
inquiry into runway incursions were identified. These
include:
N Yearly analysis and reporting to monitor and report on
trends in runway incursions.
N Investigate the culture of reporting runway incursions.
This should include percentages of incursions that are
reported, factors that affect reporting, and how this has
changed over time.
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